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Abstract
Norms are ideals that serve as guiding beacon in many human activ-
ities. They are considered to transcend accepted social and cultural 
practices, and reflect some universal, moral principles. In this chap-
ter, we will show that norms are cognitive constructs by considering 
several examples in the domains of language, art and aesthetics, law, 
science and mathematics. We will argue that, yes, norms are ideals 
that we posit, so in this respect they go beyond current social and cul-
tural values. However, norms are posited using cognitive mechanisms 
and are based on our existing knowledge and wisdom. In this sense, 
norms are what we, as an individual or as a society, strive for, but they 
show the horizon effect in that they recede and transform as we pro-
gress towards them, and sometimes this transformation can be radical.
1. Introduction
Plato argued that moral values like justice, and aesthetic values like 
beauty, are not a matter of social convention or practical advantage, 
but are grounded in objectivity, just like mathematical concepts.1 This 
1 See, for instance, Republic.
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sentiment was echoed relatively recently by M.K. Gandhi: “An error 
does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation, nor does 
truth become error because nobody sees it. Truth stands, even if there 
be no public support. It is self sustained.” These objective, mind-in-
dependent values or truths are called norms.
Norms play a key role in various human endeavours and institu-
tions. In law, for example, concepts of justice, right and wrong, are con-
sidered objective, and not a matter of social acceptance. So even though 
slavery was widely practiced and accepted at one time, one argues, it 
was morally and objectively wrong. Similar arguments underlie heated 
debates on issues such as abortion, gay marriages, and so on.
In language, it has been argued, proper names and natural kinds 
point to the essences of their referents, and any descriptions that a cog-
nitive agent may associate with them are incidental. Scientific con-
cepts are even more so: gravity, in this view, is a mind-independent 
aspect of reality, which was discovered by Newton, as someone finds 
a set of lost keys. Mathematical concepts are perhaps extreme in this 
regard, for numbers, geometric figures such as triangles, mathemati-
cal operations are all considered pure, abstract and mind-independent.
In art, even though one admits of cultural variations, true beauty 
is considered to transcend social practices and customs. A mind-inde-
pendent view of aesthetics can account for cases when previously ob-
scure works come to be highly regarded both by art experts and gen-
eral public – there aesthetic value is considered to be discovered, like 
Newton’s discovery of gravity.
In this chapter, my aim is to critically examine this mind-inde-
pendent view of norms from a cognitive perspective. I will consider 
five domains: language, art, law, science, and mathematics; and in 
each domain I will present a few examples to illustrate how norms 
change. Based on these examples, I will argue that norms are cogni-
tive constructs: they have an objective component, but are nonethe-
less shaped by cognitive interaction initiated by the cognitive agent. 
Norms can change as individuals and societies grow and evolve; 
moreover, this evolution is non-monotonic in that it allows Kuh-
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nian revolutions – creative insights often manifest such revolutions. 
Though fully acknowledging that norms are not based on accepted 
social practices, I will argue that norms are ideals that a society pos-
its for itself as utopian goals to be achieved. However, these ideals 
are based on the existing beliefs of the cognitive agents and the soci-
ety. As the knowledge of the cognitive agents grows, and their society 
evolves, these ideals (and, therefore, the norms) also change. In this 
regard, I will conclude, norms show the horizon effect.
In the next five sections, I will analyse examples from the do-
mains of language, art, law, science, and mathematics, in this order. 
As the issue of a norm is quite complex in each of these domains, the 
discussion here is intended to highlight the cognitive aspects under-
lying normativity, rather than a deep and thorough discussion of nor-
mativity in the respective domains.
2. Normativity in language
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of normativity in language 
is Kripke’s theory of proper names,2 and Putnam’s theory of natural 
kinds.3 In order to illustrate the cognitive aspects of normativity in 
language, I will focus on Kripke’s theory in this section.
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke4 argued that proper names are 
rigid designators; that is, there is a direct and rigid (across all possible 
worlds) association between a proper name and its referent. Any descrip-
tions associated with the name are incidental. Descriptions do not de-
fine the referent, and names are not a label for a cluster of descriptions.
Let us examine what are considered to be the epistemic argu-
ments that Kripke puts forth in support of the rigid designator the-
ory. Kripke notes that descriptions can turn out to be in error. So, for 
2 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1980.
3 H. Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in idem, Mind, Language and Reality. Philo-
sophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1975, pp. 215–272.
4 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, op. cit.
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instance, for most people, Kurt Gödel is the person who proved the 
incompleteness theorem, so this feature might be taken as the defin-
ing description of who Kurt Gödel was. However, it may well turn 
out that Kurt Gödel did not prove the incompleteness theorem. In 
this case, we would say that we were mistaken in assuming that Kurt 
Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem, and not that we have been 
using the name Kurt Gödel to refer to the wrong person.
Kripke goes on to argue that even prototypical descriptions asso-
ciated with a name may turn out to be in error; most of the descrip-
tions associated with the name may turn out to be in error; even all of 
descriptions may turn out to be in error. Though one can take this po-
sition philosophically, if we consider it from a cognitive point of view, 
it raises a serious question: if all the descriptions associated with a 
name turn out to be in error, how is the error discovered?
To appreciate this point, let us look at the details of an actual case 
of error discovery: Han van Meegeren’s (1889–1947) forgeries of 
Johannes Vermeer (1632–1675). In 1930s, van Meegeren painted a 
number of works in the style of Vermeer. One of them, Christ with the 
Adulteress, was bought by an art dealer in 1942, and eventually sold 
to Reichsmarschall Herman Göring for 1.65 million guilders. After 
Germany’s surrender in May 1945, van Meegeren was arrested and 
charged with being a Nazi collaborator. Facing the bleak prospect of 
a long prison sentence, or possibly the death penalty, van Meegeren 
confessed to having forged the painting. People did not believe him at 
first – they assumed that he was just saying this to save himself from 
the harsh penalty, for art experts had authenticated the so-called Ver-
meers. To convince them, he painted another ‘Vermeer’ in front of 
witnesses. After that, an expert panel concluded that the painting sold 
to Göring was not a genuine Vermeer but a forgery.5 
5 E. Dolnick, The Forger's Spell: A True Story of Vermeer, Nazis, and the Greatest Art 
Hoax of the Twentieth Century, Harper, New York 2008; J. Lopez, The Man Who Made 
Vermeers: Unvarnishing the Legend of Master Forger Han Van Meegeren, Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, New York 2008; E. Morris, “Bamboozling ourselves (Part 1 – Part 
7)”, The New York Times, May 27– June 4, 2009. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
category/bamboozling-ourselves/ (accessed on Dec. 25, 2011.)
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Even after all this, one Brussels-based art expert disagreed with 
the expert panel, and argued (in 1951) that two of the so-called fake 
Vermeers were actually genuine. One art collector sued the head of 
the expert panel because it had brought down the value of his ‘Ver-
meers’. Even though the court sided with the expert panel (in 1955), 
it was only much later that Pb-210-dating (1967) and gas chromatog-
raphy (1977) confirmed beyond doubt that those ‘Vermeers’ were for-
geries, for the paint pigment used in them did not exist in Vermeer’s 
time.
There are two points that I would like to highlight in this story. 
One is that even though one can take the normative view that the 
works of Vermeer are the works actually painted by him, and any 
properties, like the style etc. are incidental, in order to determine 
whether a painting is indeed a Vermeer or not, we have to rely on 
some other descriptions to access the referent so that its authenticity 
(whether it satisfies the normativity criteria) can be checked. If some 
researcher were trying to establish that Kurt Gödel did not actually 
prove the incompleteness theorem, she or he would have to use some 
other descriptions to identify the referent of the name Kurt Gödel, and 
then establish, using some descriptions again, that this person could 
not have or did not prove the incompleteness theorem. So even though 
most of the descriptions associated with Kurt Gödel might turn out to 
be in error, it is logically impossible to have all the descriptions turn 
out to be incorrect, for if that were so, we would have no way of find-
ing this out.
The second instructive point concerning this Vermeer story is 
that when new techniques like Pb-210-dating or gas chromatogra-
phy come into being, new attributes (descriptions) to existing objects 
(like the disputed Vermeers) were added. In this process, it is the (pre-
viously) existing descriptions of the object that ensure continuity. In 
other words, we access the referent through existing descriptions, ap-
ply the new technique (or perceptual/cognitive process) on it, and 
then enrich the description of the referent based on the observed re-
sults. This allows us to say that we have discovered new properties 
of the referent.
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To sum up this discussion, though we may posit a normative ac-
count of meaning, so that a name rigidly points to the same referent 
across all possible worlds, the descriptions associated with the name 
are not mere spectators. The descriptions provide the only cognitive 
mechanism for an agent to access the referent. So, though it quite pos-
sible that each available description, no matter how critical or impor-
tant it may be deemed, can turn out to be in error, it is not possible 
(from a cognitive point of view) that all of the descriptions are in er-
ror. Notice here that the fact that an object was named such-and-such 
in a naming ceremony itself becomes a description. Later, if there is 
a dispute whether the object named such-and-such has a certain at-
tribute, we have to access the object via its descriptions related to the 
naming ceremony (using historical research.)
Thus, norms in language (at least for proper names) are ideals 
that we posit, but those ideals in their true sense are not cognitively 
accessible. Because each of the description can be in error, we can-
not be sure that the description we used to access the referent is itself 
not in error. As we interact with the referent more and more, and our 
knowledge about it grows (as was the case with the fake Vermeers), 
our normative ideals itself can change.
Similar arguments have been made for the normative status of 
natural kind words like water or whale,6 but we will discuss them later 
in Section 5 while considering normativity in science.
3. Normativity in art and aesthetics
One of the fake Vermeers by van Meegeren, The Supper at Emmaus, 
was praised highly by art experts, and hung in a well-known mu-
seum in Rotterdam in the late 1930s. Many people must have passed 
through the museum, looked and admired the painting, and had some 
6 H. Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, op. cit.
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kind of aesthetic experience. Are there any normative aspects of such 
aesthetic experiences?
There are a number of parameters that affect aesthetic experience, 
one of which is the context effect. A striking example of this is pro-
vided by the case of Joshua Bell, a world-renowned violinist, when he 
played six classical pieces in a Metro stop in Washington DC during 
rush hour, and hardly anyone stopped by to listen to him; while peo-
ple pay over $100 a seat to listen to him in a concert hall.7 This illus-
trates a phenomenon that Nelson Goodman has dubbed When is Art?.8 
The same object (or the same performance) can be perceived (aesthet-
ically speaking) quite differently depending on the context. So when 
Marcel Duchamp put an upside down urinal in a museum (Fountain, 
1917), it served a different purpose, exemplified different attributes, 
and evoked a different aesthetic experience, compared to when it is 
placed in a men’s toilet. However, for our purpose here, we can fix the 
context so that we consider the difference in the aesthetic experiences 
of viewing an authentic Vermeer and a fake Vermeer, when both are 
hung ceremoniously in an art museum.
Another parameter is the difference between aesthetic value and 
artistic value, as articulated by Kulka.9 The artistic value refers to the 
appreciation attached to a work of art by the community of art experts 
(and people as well), as reflected in the awards, monetary value, etc. 
7 G. Weingarten, “Pearls before breakfast: Can one of the nation’s great musicians cut 
through the fog of a D.C. rush hour? Let’s find out”, Washington Post, April 8, 2007. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/pearls-before-breakfast-can- 
one-of-the-nations-great-musicians-cut-through-the-fog-of-a-dc-rush-hour-lets-find-
out/2014/09/23/8a6d46da-4331-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html (accessed on 30 
September, 2014); see also J. Contrera, “Joshua Bell is playing in the Metro again. 
This time, maybe you won’t pass it up”, Washington Post, September 23, 2014. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/joshua-bell-is-playing-in-the-metro-
again-this-time-you-can-plan-to-be-there/2014/09/23/7a699e28-4282-11e4-9a15-
137aa0153527_story.html (accessed on 30 September, 2014).
8 N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, Indianapolis 1978.
9 T. Kulka, “Forgeries and art evaluation: An argument for dualism in aesthetics”, Jour-
nal of Aesthetic Evaluation 39(3), 2005, 58–70.
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Though these two values clearly influence one another, we would like 
to focus here on the aesthetic value.
A recent case of art forgeries perhaps best exemplifies the problem 
of normativity of aesthetic experiences. Wolfgang Beltracchi made a 
career in creating fakes purported to be from such well-known art-
ists as Heinrich Campendonk, Max Ernst, and Fernand Léger. When 
a long-lost Max Ernst [fake], La Forêt was ‘discovered’, Dorothea 
Tanning, the widow of Max Ernst, supposedly exclaimed that it was 
the most beautiful picture that her late husband [Max Ernst] had ever 
painted. When the scam was exposed and Wolfgang and his wife 
Helene were arrested and sentenced to prison, their daughter Fran-
ziska remarked, “What [my parents] did was criminal–it’s a fact. But 
I think they didn’t really hurt anybody. They took money for pictures 
that people wanted. Maybe now they’re not worth anything, but they 
still got the picture. I don’t think it’s fair that they went to jail.”10 
Franziska’s comments illustrate the view that a painting is essen-
tially you get what you see: the aesthetic experience is the totality of 
the visual experience, and nothing more. So, in this view, what is the 
difference (aesthetically) between viewing an authentic work and a 
fake? For instance, now even average art students can ‘see’ that the 
fake Vermeers are of rather poor quality. After the Beltracchi fakes 
were revealed, some experts described them as crude fakes. So how 
does the aesthetic experience change from one time to another?
Nelson Goodman has addressed this issue in an insightful essay 
Art and Authenticity.11 His explanation is that our aesthetic percep-
tion, individually and also as a social or cultural group, changes as 
we interact with more and more artworks. So every time one views 
a work of art, their aesthetic criteria (which can be considered akin 
to norms) change a little bit. Over time, these little bits can add up to 
a big macro shift. Modern art students are exposed to authentic Ver-
10 J. Hammer, “The greatest fake-art scam in history?”, Vanity Fair (Art), October 10, 
2012. http://www.vanityfair.com/unchanged/2012/10/wolfgang-beltracchi-helene-art-
scam (accessed on 15 September 2014).
11 N. Goodman, Languages of Art, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1968, Chap. III.
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meers and fake Vermeers, and they learn to distinguish their aesthetic 
values perceptually (without needing the advanced technology of gas 
chromatography), and in this sense we can say that their aesthetic 
norms have changed. 
Mark Sagoff12 proposed an alternative explanation for why there 
might be a difference in the aesthetic experience when viewing an 
original as opposed to a fake. He argued that one cannot consider aes-
thetic experience with an artwork in isolation, but it has to be con-
sidered in the context of other related artworks. So (in his view), it 
is meaningless to compare the aesthetics of an original with that of a 
forgery, as they do not belong to a meaningful semantic class. Even 
though this approach is usually contrasted with that of Goodman,13 I 
submit that the two approaches are quite consistent. What Goodman 
points out is that when the first fake Vermeer or Max Ernst appears in 
the market, it is compared with the existing set of Vermeers and Max 
Ernsts. But as the scam is exposed, and more fakes are unmasked, the 
class of paintings that the fakes are compared to is changed, thereby 
changing their aesthetic experience.
In the search for universal aesthetic norms, it is worth mention-
ing the proposal of Ramachandran and Hirstein.14 They put forth 
eight laws of aesthetic experience that are grounded in our neural 
and perceptual processes. For example, one law is that of peak shift, 
according to which if certain perceptual attributes (of form, posture, 
colour, etc.) are preferable for us (for whatever evolutionary rea-
sons), then to emphasize them further, even to an unrealistic extent, 
is more attractive. There is much supporting evidence for this prin-
ciple from animal research. For instance, Tinbergen15 noted that a 
seagull chick pecks at its mother’s beak to get food. Similar to Kon-
12 M. Sagoff, “The aesthetic status of forgeries”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criti-
cism 35 (2), 1976, 169–180.
13 For example, see T. Kulka, “Forgeries and art evaluation...”, op. cit.
14 V. S. Ramachandran, W. Hirstein, “The science of art: A neurological theory of aes-
thetic experience”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (6–7), 1999, 15–51.
15 N. Tinbergen,Curious Naturalists, Basic Books, New York 1954.
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rad Lorenz’s famous experiments with goslings that demonstrated 
biological imprinting, Tinbergen found that seagull chicks respond 
equally well to a brown stick with a red dot at the end. But surpris-
ingly, they found that the chicks respond even more effectively to 
a longer brown stick with three red stripes at the end, even though 
this does not correspond to any natural stimuli. Ramachandran and 
Hirstein use this peak shift principle to explain occurrences of ex-
aggerated female forms found in ancient Indian artwork, in medie-
val art, in Picasso, and so on.
While acknowledging that there are some neurological factors 
that constrain our aesthetic experience, there is much evidence that 
higher-level cognitive factors can override these constraints and sig-
nificantly alter our aesthetic experience. In the examples of fake Ver-
meers and Max Ernsts discussed above, the belief whether one is 
looking at an authentic artwork or a fake can affect her or his aes-
thetic appreciation. Morris,16 echoing the direct reference theory of 
Kripke,17 points out that for visual arts, the history of the work is an 
essential component of its identity, and thereby affects its aesthetic 
potential. But history of an artwork is a matter of our current state of 
knowledge, and the background and beliefs of the viewer.
Many studies in different domains support the view that our be-
liefs and expectations have a remarkable influence on our percep-
tion and behaviour. For example, Lang et al.18 showed that the ag-
gressive behaviour of participants after drinking was affected by 
what they thought they were drinking rather that what they actually 
drank. Brochet19 found similar effect with wine tasting: the partic-
16 E. Morris, “More bamboozling”, The New York Times, June 17, 2009. http://opin-
ionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/more-bamboozling/#more-10885 (accessed on 
Dec. 25, 2011.)
17 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, op. cit.
18 A. R. Lang, D. J. Goeckner, V. J. Adesso, G. A. Marlatt, “Effect of alcohol on aggres-
sion in male social drinkers”, Journal of Abnormal Psychology 84 (5), 1975, 508–518.
19 F. Brocher, Tasting: Study of chemical representations of objects in the field of con-
sciousness, PhD thesis, Faculty of Oenology of Bordeaux, Laboratory of General Oe-
nology 2001.
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ipants’ perception of taste depended on the bottle from which the 
wine was poured, even though it was the same wine.20 All this points 
to the fact that our expectations, past experience, and understand-
ing influences our perception and aesthetic experience. More impor-
tantly, as our experience grows, these expectations change and so 
do our aesthetic norms.
Martindale21 provides an interesting study on how aesthetic norms 
can change over a long period of time. He started by formulating a 
framework for creativity in art, according to which societies require 
novelty, but in small doses. When a novel style is introduced, art-
works in the new style have a high arousal potential. But over time, 
due to habituation, novelty wears off, and another shot of novelty is 
necessary, which requires that a new style be introduced. He tested his 
theory by analysing many genres of art, including British poetry over 
a span of 650 years (from 1290 to 1949), and found clear evidence of 
cyclical changes in the style.22
To conclude, we see that aesthetic experience is essentially a cog-
nitive process. Though there are some biological constraints, but by 
and large cultural and social conventions, background knowledge and 
beliefs of the viewer, expectations of the viewer etc. dominate the aes-
thetic experience related to a particular artwork in a given context. 
Moreover, these expectations change over time resulting in a shift of 
aesthetic norms.
20 See also R. Goldstein, J. Almenberg, A. Dreber, J. W.  Emerson, A. Herschkowitsch, 
J. Katz, “Do more expensive wines taste better? Evidence from a large sample of blind 
tastings”, Journal of Wine Economics 3 (1), 2008, 1–9; L. Lee, S. Frederick, D. Ariely, 
“Try it, you’ll like it – the influence of expectation, consumption, and revelation on 
preferences for beer”, Psychological Science 17 (12), 2006, 1054–1058.
21 C. Martindale, The Clockwork Muse: The Predictability of Artistic Change, Basic 
Books, New York 1990, Chap. 4.
22 See also R. K. Sawyer, Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK) 2006, Chap. 9.
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4. Normativity in law
The extent to which law is normative is a somewhat controversial is-
sue.23 On one extreme there are natural law thinkers who conflate le-
gal norms with moral norms. Legal positivists, on the other hand, con-
sider legal norms to be distinct from moral norms. Sidestepping this 
debate, in this section I would like to present a few examples of how 
legal norms change.
Consider a very basic legal concept, that of personhood. The Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution states: “No person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a grand jury…”24
Now who qualifies to be a ‘person’? The amendment was ratified 
in 1791, when slavery was an accepted practice. Slaves were regarded 
as property, so they clearly were not ‘persons.’ For instance, in the 
case of Dred Scott v. Sandford [60 U.S. 393 (1857)], the US Supreme 
court ruled that slaves, including those freed by their masters, were 
not US citizens and could not sue in federal court. 
Another twenty-two years later, there was another case before the 
courts: Standing Bear vs. General Crook [United States ex rel. Stand-
ing Bear v. Crook, 25 F.Cas. 695 (C.C.D.Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891)]. 
Standing Bear was a Ponca Native American chief. When Europeans 
were settling in America, Native Americans were forcibly resettled 
into reservations, and were prohibited from venturing out. Standing 
Bear, with a group of followers left the reservation to bury his eldest 
son. Brigadier General George Crook was sent to arrest the Poncas 
and bring them back to the reservation. General Crook, however, was 
sympathetic to the plight of Native Americans, and encouraged them 
to seek legal redress.
23 See for a recent discussion: T. Spaak, “Kelsen and Hart on the Normativity of Law”, 
in Perspectives on Jurisprudence: Essays in Honour of Jes Bjarup, P. Wahlgren (ed.) 
pp. 397–414. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=922755.
24 Emphasise added. As we are interested in the concept of person, we can skip the rest 
of the text.
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During the trial, the main issue was whether a Native American is 
a person, so that the Fifth Amendment and habeas corpus can be ap-
plied to them. The District Attorney relied on the Dred Scott decision 
to argue that Native Americans, because they were not US citizens, 
cannot file a writ of habeas corpus. The lawyers for the Poncas argued 
that citizenship is not an issue but personhood. In a very dignified and 
moving short speech, after the closing arguments had ended, Stand-
ing Bear said (through an interpreter), “That hand is not the color of 
yours, but if I pierce it, I shall feel pain. If you pierce your hand, you 
also feel pain. The blood that will flow from mine will be of the same 
color as yours. I am a man. The same God made us both.”
In his decision, Judge Dundy used Webster’s definition of ‘per-
son’ and issued an order releasing the Poncas. In summarizing his de-
cision, he wrote, “an Indian is a PERSON within the meaning of the 
laws of the United States, and has therefore the right to sue out a writ 
of habeas corpus in a federal court.”25
We can also see the evolution of the legal concept of personhood 
in two other strands. One concerns voting rights in the US. Though 
there were some variations among different states, initially the vot-
ing rights were extended only to white males who owned property 
and paid taxes. Slowly, it was relaxed so that all white males were el-
igible. The 15th Amendment in 1870 gave the voting rights to black 
males, but the women had to wait until 1920 (19th Amendment). In 
1971, the 26th Amendment lowered the voting age to 18 (from 21), 
which was largely due to the social pressure from the Vietnam war: it 
seemed anomalous that people in the age group 18–21 were required 
to serve in the military and could die for their country, but were not 
eligible to vote for their government representative.
The other strand related to personhood concerns abortion laws. 
Almost everyone can agree on two extremes: before an egg is ferti-
25 J. Starita, “The Case of Standing Bear: Establishing personhood under the law”, 
Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association, Vol. 45, Paper 287, 
2009, 4–11, http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/287.
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lised, there is no person and no rights, but when the baby is born, the 
baby has certain rights (well, perhaps not the voting rights). Now if 
we look the foetal development: at about four weeks the fertilised cell 
implants itself in the uterus; heart, brain, spinal cord begin to form at 
week 5; around week 6 spinal cord connects to the brain and the heart 
starts to pump, facial features begin to appear; in week 7 baby’s head 
develops; in week 8 eyes become visible; toes form in week 9; neck 
developed in week 10; genitals develop in week 11; and fingernails 
start to develop in week 12; and so on. The point is that the develop-
ment of foetus from the conception to the birth is a gradual process. 
However, as long as the baby is inside the womb, there is a potential 
conflict between the rights of the mother and the rights of the foetus. 
Abortion laws are aimed to address this issue. In the US, for instance, 
Roe v Wade is considered a landmark ruling drawing a line at the 1st 
trimester (so 12 weeks), which seems quite arbitrary. The complex-
ity of this issue is evident in that this is still a very emotional and dis-
turbing topic for many people, violent debate rages on, and a social 
and legal solution that will satisfy everyone does not seem to be in 
sight. A very thorough and thought-provoking discussion is provided 
in Ford.26 Interestingly, he argues that personhood (or soul) appears 
after 14 days, which is based on the criteria that identical twinning is 
not possible after that.
Let us look at another example from Australian law, which con-
cerns whether Aborigines had sovereignty and land rights. Until re-
cently, the indigenous people of Australia had few if any proprietary 
rights in Australian land. When one considers that the Australian in-
digenous people had settled the land some 40,000 years prior to the 
English invasion, this seems unfair; and even more so when one con-
siders that under English law the aborigines should have been granted 
limited sovereignty over Australia. At the time of the settlement of 
Australia, English law drew the distinction between lands that were 
26 N. Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Phi-
losophy and Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK) 1991.
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colonised where there was an existing population of people, and lands 
that were settled where there were no people. Where the land was 
colonised, the indigenous laws of the people remained, but where the 
land was empty – in Latin terra nullius – English law landed at the 
same moment as the first foot of the British seafarers. Under Brit-
ish colonial rule, Australia was held to be terra nullius at the time 
of white settlement. This was nothing more than a patent fiction, as 
the evidence of its falsity – the native people, their settlements, their 
tools, their culture – was present everywhere. Nonetheless the fiction 
remained and it was held that the only property laws in Australia were 
those stemming from the introduction of the white rule; laws which 
were less than generous in their grant of land to the Aborigines. 
The original cases – created during the 1800s in an era of laissez 
faire capitalism and blatant racism – set the precedent to limit aborig-
inal holdings of land, except as a consequence of the English property 
law. Subsequent cases merely adopted the principle that Australia was 
‘empty land’ even though the fiction was always obvious. This illus-
trates what in psychology is called einstellung effect:27 when people 
are used to solving problems in a certain way, they continue to use 
the same schema without exploring alternate possibilities that may be 
more efficient (or, as in this case, more fair.) It is inconceivable that 
no judge in these cases – whether at trial or during any of the numer-
ous appeals that they entailed – never perceived the term ‘empty land’ 
to be at odds with their eventual decision to uphold the white rule. 
However, as with Standing Bear vs. General Cook, one court fi-
nally reconsidered the whole doctrine. This happened in the case of 
Mabo v Queensland (No.2). [(1992) 175 CLR 1]. In Mabo, the Aus-
tralian High Court held that previous decisions – holding that Aus-
tralia was terra nullius at settlement – were wrong at law. This is an 
interesting decision in that the court did not decide to change the law 
to accommodate modern developments, in the way we see this done 
27 A. S. Luchins, “Mechanisation in problem solving: the effect of Einstellung”, Psy-
chological Monographs 54 (Whole No. 248), 1942.
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in fields as diverse as homicide (including a new defence for ‘battered 
wives’) or tax (making modern-day tax evasion illegal) or discrimi-
nation law (adding age or sexual-preference as grounds for anti-dis-
crimination suits). Instead, the court went back to the basic terra nul-
lius formulation at the time of white settlement, and concluded that 
the previous courts were wrong according to the law at the time. Not-
withstanding prior cases to this effect, the High Court said that Aus-
tralia could not have been an empty land at settlement, since the Abo-
riginal presence meant that, according to the law of the time, it was a 
colonised country. Aboriginal law had thus remained in force for the 
200 years that the white courts had declared that it never existed. This 
is a remarkable example of a norm shift, though similar processes oc-
cur all the time as judges adapt laws to social needs.28
As a final example, I would like to present a case discussed by 
Susan Haack.29 She examines a 1927 US Supreme Court ruling on 
Buck v. Bell, where the court argued that Carrie Buck’s constitutional 
rights would not be violated if the State of Virginia were to sterilize 
her against her will under the state’s eugenics law. According to the 
law, the State of Virginia could sterilize the Epileptic and the Feeble 
Minded. The justification for the law was that this was in the interest 
of the larger society.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. compared this case to that of vaccinating individuals, even against 
their will, because it is in the larger interest of the society and the risk 
to the individual is miniscule. In her detailed analysis of Holmes’s 
background and earlier legal and philosophical writings, Haack ar-
gues that the decision took into account the prevailing scientific view 
at that time, namely that feeble-mindedness is hereditary. It is only 
later, when the horrors of the widespread application of eugenics un-
28 See also D. Hunter, B. Indurkhya, “‘Don’t Think, but Look’ A Gestalt Interactionist 
Approach to Legal Thinking”, Proceedings of the Workshop on Advances in Analogy 
Research, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1999, 345–353.
29 S. Haack, “Pragmatism, law, and morality: The lessons of Buck v. Bell”, European 
Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy III, 2, 2011, 65–87.
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der the Nazi regime were experienced, courts became more cautious. 
For instance, in 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 
decided on the constitutional status of an Oklahoma legislation that 
allowed the state to sterilize a person who committed three felonies 
involving ‘moral turpitude.’ In rendering the decision, Justice Doug-
las wrote, “The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far 
reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause 
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and 
disappear.”30
To conclude, we see that even though law tends to be conserv-
ative in the sense that legal concepts are regarded with stability – 
their interpretations are not changed so lightly, and they are consid-
ered to transcend existing social practices; nonetheless, legal concepts 
also evolve as our scientific knowledge progresses and social norms 
change. We can see this process clearly in the current legal wrangling 
concerning gay marriages.
5. Normativity in science
It is difficult to dispute that scientific concepts change and evolve 
over time. As early as 1866, Charles Sanders Pierce quipped, “Per-
ception is the possibility of acquiring information, meaning more; 
now a word may learn. How much more the word electricity means 
now than it meant in the days of Franklin; how much more the term 
planet means now than it did in the time [of] Hipparchus. These 
words have acquired information; just as a man’s thought does by 
further perception.”31
The issue we would like to focus on here is whether there is a nor-
mative component (ontologically speaking) to scientific concepts. For 
30 S. Haack, “Pragmatism, law, and morality...”, op. cit., p. 83.
31 C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. 7: Science and Philosophy, A. W. Burks (ed.), 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1958–66, par. 587.
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instance, at about the same time that Saul Kripke was arguing for his 
direct reference theory of proper names, Hilary Putnam32 argued that 
natural kind terms like ‘tiger’ and ‘water’ have a mind-independent 
ontology. So, for example, ‘water’ refers to this substance here, and 
is it is connected to all other such substances by virtue of its essence 
(or chemistry), even though we may not yet know all aspects of this 
essence. Putnam argued that this view is necessary to maintain our in-
tuition that we discover the chemical structure of water, and not that 
we posit a new substance that includes chemical structure as one of 
its attributes.
Notwithstanding such arguments, I would like to present here 
some examples to illustrate the cognitive aspects of this normativity. 
There are interesting historical accounts of how and when whales were 
classified as mammals,33 and how Pluto was declassified as a planet.34 
They reveal how our concepts of mammals and planets evolved over 
the years and generations as our scientific knowledge grew. But for 
our discussion here, let us consider the concept of vacuum.
In 1643, when Torricelli filled a tube, closed at one end, with mer-
cury, and inverted it into a tub filled with mercury, he found that the 
mercury in the tube did not all fall out. The mercury level dropped 
somewhat, but then the remaining column of mercury stayed sus-
pended inside the tube. There was a wide-ranging debate among the 
scientists and philosophers of those days about an explanation of this 
phenomenon, and on the nature of the empty space between the top 
of the tube and the level of mercury. There were vacuists who pos-
ited that there was vacuum in this space, and there were plenists, who 
claimed that the idea of vacuum is simply logically inconsistent with 
that of space, and were seeking alternate explanations.
32 H. Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, op. cit.
33 A. Romero, “When Whales Became Mammals: The Scientific Journey of Cetaceans 
From Fish to Mammals in the History of Science”, in New Approaches to the Study of 
Marine Mammals, A. Romero and E.O. Keith (eds.), InTech, Rijeka (Croatia) 2012, 
pp. 3–30.
34 D. A. Weintraub, Is Pluto a Planet? A Historical Journey through the Solar System, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 2008.
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To explore these ideas, Robert Boyle in England devised an air 
pump and, what some consider to have been the first physics experi-
ments, conducted a number of tests to check out various hypotheses. 
For instance, in one experiment, he immersed the Torricelli apparatus in 
a big chamber, and sucked the air out of the chamber using his air pump. 
He found that the mercury level in the tube falls rapidly but does not 
quite reach the level in the tub. Several of his contemporaries, including 
well-known natural philosopher Thomas Hobbes, refused to accept the 
results of these experiments or their interpretations. Hobbes, for exam-
ple, raised doubts about the working of the pump itself, and questioned 
if the air is indeed being sucked out. He also made several methodolog-
ical arguments against Boyle’s experimental set up.35
The arguments raised against the notion of vacuum were quite in-
teresting. Linus, for instance, argued that because we can see through 
this space, it could not be vacuum. This was based on the assump-
tion that no visible species can proceed from or through vacuum. (It 
is interesting to note that this conception of vacuum is similar to our 
modern concept of a black hole.) He also used another experiment to 
counter Boyle’s theory. If you close the upper opening of the Torri-
celli tube with your finger, you can feel a downward suction when the 
experiment is performed. Linus argued that this contradicts Boyle’s 
explanation that the mercury is being pushed up the tube by the pres-
sure of external air. He posited a substance, which he called funicu-
lus, in the Torricellian space that holds the column of mercury in po-
sition, and pulls our finger down. 
This brief discussion shows that the concept of vacuum is cogni-
tively constructed based on experimental observations and available 
theories and models that explain those observations. We cannot see it, 
but can only perceive its manifestation indirectly: mediated by some 
theoretical model.
35 See for an excellent account of Boyle-Hobbes debate: S. Shapin, S. Schaffer, Levia-
than and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton (NJ) 1985/2011. 
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Let us consider a related example where the referent turned out 
to be non-existent: namely that of aether. Sir Isaac Newton, while 
formulating his gravitation theory, felt that there has to be some me-
dium through which gravitational fields can travel and distant objects 
can interact, so he posited aether, which permeates all space.36 Later 
on, when Huygens proposed the wave theory of light, he required a 
medium for the light waves to travel (as longitudinal waves), and so 
aether was conveniently adapted. It was only in 1887, when Albert 
A. Michelson and Edward W. Morley performed their famous exper-
iment in Cleveland, Ohio, that raised serious doubts about the exist-
ence of aether. It is interesting to note that Michelson was a strong 
proponent of the aether theory, and continued to look for the evidence 
supporting it with another colleague Dayton Miller.37
These examples illustrate that the referents of the scientific con-
cepts are not something that are sitting in the external world waiting for 
us to discover their essences. We access the referents through our cogni-
tive models or theories, which dictate what aspects of these referents we 
observe, what possible actions we can take on them, and what are the 
possible outcomes.38 All scientific discussion assumes some norms, for 
norms dictate the methodology that is acceptable. However, this meth-
odology evolves, and changes drastically from time to time.
To illustrate this point, consider Francesco Sizzi’s argument 
against Galileo discovery of satellites of Jupiter. “There are seven 
windows in the head, two nostrils, two eyes, two ears, and a mouth; 
so in the heavens there are two favourable stars, two unpropitious, 
two luminaries, and Mercury alone undecided and indifferent. From 
which and many other similar phenomena of nature, such as the seven 
metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the 
36 L. Rosenfeld, “Newton’s views on aether and gravitation”, Archive for History of 
Exact Sciences 6 (1), 1969, 29–37.
37 See G. Johnson, The Ten Most Beautiful Experiments, Vintage, London 2009 Chap. 8.
38 See also S. Hawking, L. Mlodinow, The Grand Design, Bentam Books, New York 
2010, Chap. 3; B. Indurkhya, “Rationality and reasoning with metaphors”, New Ideas 
in Psychology 25, 2007, 16–36; B. Indurkhya, “Thought experiments, models, and the 
heuristic power of metaphors in science”, to appear.
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number of planets is necessarily seven.”39 Nowadays we consider this 
argument quite irrational, and almost humorous, but Francesco Sizzi 
was a respected astronomer of his time: he was credited with discov-
ering the annual movement of sunspots. Moreover, he was not alone 
in expressing these sentiments, for another well-respected scientist 
of that time, Francis Bacon, who also had a great regard for empiri-
cal observations, made very similar arguments. This shows that Sizzi 
and Bacon were working with a different set of norms. For them, God 
made the universe in harmony, and there are some universal laws 
about it. In particular, human design reflects cosmos design, so from 
the seven windows of the head we may infer seven planets.40 Another 
example is provided by Einstein, who initially rejected quantum me-
chanics, famously quipping, “God doesn’t play dice with the world.” 
It was inconceivable, given his normative view of physics, that nature 
would determine the outcome of the events randomly.
To sum up, we see that scientific norms are not a rigid set of 
standards laid out once and for all. On the contrary, they are con-
stantly being redefined as our scientific knowledge grows and new 
methodologies evolve. To be sure, these norms transcend the existing 
scientific practices, so one appeals to these norms (as Hobbes, Linus, 
Sizzi and Bacon did) to support or critic particular scientific claims, 
but as these claims are accepted (or rejected), the norms themselves 
change as a result of this debate.
6. Normativity in mathematics
In a best-seller science fiction novel Contact by Carl Sagan (1985), alien 
intelligence hides meaningful messages in the expansion of π, the tran-
scendental number that is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its 
39 Quoted in J. L. Christian, Philosophy: An Introduction to the Art of Wondering (11th 
ed.) Cengage Learning 2011, p. 570.
40 See also F. Leavitt, An Even Greater Scandal: I’m a Liar but You’re a Bigger One, 
Strategic Book Publishing, Houston 2012.
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diameter. The premise of this plot element is that the number π is mind-
independent, so any intelligence, no matter what form it takes, will be 
able to find this pattern and decode the message. This, in essence, ex-
emplifies the normativity of mathematics. Numbers, mathematical op-
erations, mathematical theorems etc. are all considered by many to refer 
to mind-independent, Platonic, ideal forms. However, in this section, I 
would like to present some examples to suggest otherwise.
Before delving into a couple of detailed examples, I would like to 
mention a few general works that address the cognitive aspects under-
lying mathematics. A well-known algebraist and one of the founders of 
category theory, Saunders Mac Lane, has analyzed different branches 
of mathematics, like geometry, algebra, topology to show how they 
evolved from human activities and the needs related to those activities: 
I assert that subjects of Mathematics are extracted from the environ-
ment; that is, from activities, phenomena, or science – and that they 
are then later applied to that – or other – environments. Thus num-
ber theory is ‘extracted’ from the activity of counting, and geometry 
is extracted from motion and shaping. The exact mechanism of this 
‘extraction’ has not been described in detail here; it will clearly vary 
considerably from case to case. I have deliberately chosen this work 
‘extraction’ to be close to the more familiar word ‘abstraction’ – and 
with the intent that the Mathematical subject resulting from an ex-
traction is indeed abstract. Mathematics is not ‘about’ human activity, 
phenomena, or science. It is about the extractions and formalization 
of ideas – and their manifold consequences.41
Lakoff and Núñez42 take on the audacious task of explaining the 
Euler’s equation: eiπ = -1. They quote a Harvard University Mathemat-
ics professor who tells his freshman students that he can show how to 
41 S. Mac Lane, Mathematics: Form and Function, Springer, Berlin 1986, p. 418, em-
phasis autor’s..
42 G. Lakoff, R. E. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind 
Brings Mathematics Into Being, Basic Books, New York 2000.
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derive the equation, but not what it means. Lakoff and Núñez take us 
on a journey where they explain logarithms, what is e, what is i, what 
is π, what it means to multiply i with π, and what it means to raise e 
to the power of this product, and why, at the end of it, we get a con-
crete number -1.
Another interesting work is by the neuroscientist Stanislas 
Dehaene,43 which focuses on the neurocognitive basis of numbers 
and arithmetic. He takes us on a fascinating tour detailing research on 
the number cognition in animals, babies, prodigies, people with brain 
damage, and so on, to conclude: 
The evolution of mathematics is a fact. Science historians have recorded 
its slow rise, through trial and error, to greater efficiency. It may not be 
necessary, then, to postulate that the universe was designed to conform 
to mathematical laws. Isn’t it rather our mathematical laws, and the or-
ganizing principles of our brain before them, that were selected accord-
ing to how closely they fit the structure of the universe?44
Now let us look at two examples in some detail. The first one is 
about the concept of infinity. Wallace45 provides a good overview of 
the history of infinity, and here we will focus only on one aspect of it, 
namely the cardinality or the size of infinite sets. Intuitively, for finite 
sets, a set A is bigger than another set B, if A has more elements than 
B. This is the traditional way in which Euclid, and later Galileo, char-
acterized cardinality of sets. According to this view, the whole cannot 
be of the same size (or same cardinality) as a part of it.
However, for infinite sets, this creates a paradox. The set of even 
numbers is clearly a proper subset of natural numbers, so is a part of 
it, but both are infinite. Do they have the same cardinality? Or, is the 
43 S. Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics. Revised, Ex-
panded Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK) 2011.
44 Ibidem, p. 232.
45 D. F. Wallace, Everything and More: A Compact History of Infinity, W.W. Norton, 
New York 2010.
58 Bipin Indurkhya
set of natural numbers bigger than the set of even numbers? This is-
sue becomes even more complex when we consider rational numbers, 
for they are dense. In other words, between any two rational num-
bers, no matter how close, there is another rational number. If we ap-
ply this rule recursively, we can get infinitely many rational numbers 
between any two rational numbers, no matter how close together. So, 
intuitively, it seems obvious that there ought to be more rational num-
bers than natural numbers.
In the later half of the 19th century, Richard Dedekind and Georg 
Cantor worked out a technique for assigning cardinality to infinite 
sets. Dedekind’s idea was to take the intuition from the finite sets: if a 
set A can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion into another set B, then 
A’s cardinality is smaller than or equal to B’s. And then if B can also 
be mapped in a one-to-one fashion into A, then B’s cardinality will 
be smaller than or equal to B’s. So if both conditions are satisfied, the 
sets A and B are deemed to have the same cardinality.
This works quite well for finite sets, but an advantage of defining it 
like this is that it can now be applied to infinite sets. So, for example, if 
we consider the set of natural numbers N, and the set of even numbers 
E, we can have a one-to-one mapping from E to N by mapping every 
even number to itself, and a one-to-one mapping from N to E by map-
ping every number n to 2*n. Ergo, E and N have the same cardinality.
Using this technique, Georg Cantor produced two surprising the-
orems: 1) rational numbers have the same cardinality as natural num-
bers, and 2) real numbers are more numerous (have a higher cardi-
nality) than natural numbers. Now, even a high-school student can 
understand these proofs. However, at the time they were proposed, it 
was considered a radical idea. Many leading mathematicians at that 
time refused to accept this formalization of cardinality and its impli-
cations for infinite sets.46
46 See E. T. Bell, Men of Mathematics, Simon & Schuster, New York 1937; N. Calkin, 
H. Wilf, “Recounting the rationals”, American Mathematical Monthly 107 (4), 2000, 
360–363; J. W. Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1979.
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Cantor’s intuition was that there is only one level of infinity. (Per-
haps he equated the one infinity with one God.) So he was quite ex-
cited when he was able to show that rational numbers, which are 
dense, have the same cardinality as natural numbers. Invigorated by 
his success, Cantor tried to show that real numbers are countable as 
well. Instead, what he found was a way to show that real numbers can-
not be put in a one-to-one correspondence with natural numbers. In 
particular, what he found was that if you assume any way to put real 
numbers into a one-to-one correspondence with natural numbers, then 
you can always come up with a real number that is not included in this 
enumeration. The details of Cantor’s original proof, which he spelled 
out in a letter to Dedekind, can be found in Dauben.47
The second example is from Imre Lakatos,48 who championed the 
view that mathematics is a dynamic process in which we actively con-
struct ontology of the mathematical objects as much as discovering 
their properties via lemmas and theorems. This essay is set as a class-
room discussion with a teacher and a few pupils. We start with Euler’s 
theorem concerning polyhedra, namely V – E + F = 2, where V is the 
number of vertices, E is the number of edges and F is the number of 
faces. First, the students verify the conjecture with some examples, 
and then construct a formal proof. The proof is construction-based: it 
requires cutting and deforming the polyhedra. But they go carefully 
through each step of the proof, examining alternatives and questions 
if they can indeed do the required cutting and stretching. Then, they 
try to construct counter examples to refute the proof. Lakatos distin-
guishes between local and global counter examples: local ones ques-
tion some specific step in the proof, but the global ones try to refute 
the main conjecture. For example, in the case of Euler’s theorem, a 
cube with a cube-shaped hole inside it refutes the theorem.
47 J. W. Dauben, Georg Cantor..., op. cit., pp. 50–54.
48 I. Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, J. Wor-
rall, & E. Zahar (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK) 1976.
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Lakatos then discusses two mechanisms that are used to fix such 
problems. One is monster barring, which works by redefining the 
concepts (polyhedra in this case) so as to exclude the counter exam-
ple (the monster). The other is weakening the theorem, so that the 
counter example is included. As we apply these two mechanisms, we 
partly change the ontology of the mathematical concepts, and partly 
discover new relationships among them. Donald Knuth49 also cap-
tured this kind of dynamic interaction very elegantly in a monograph 
on surreal numbers.
We can see the evidence of Lakatosian mechanisms in science as 
well. For example, Pluto’s status as a planet became questionable be-
cause a number of bodies of similar size were identified in the same 
region of the solar system. It seems that Pluto was one of a cluster 
of bodies constituting the Kuiper belt. This situation is very similar 
to what Lakatos discusses in Proofs and Refutations. Because of this 
discovery, astronomers felt a need to define the concept of planet for-
mally, and these new definitions excluded Pluto from the planet cat-
egory. 
These examples provide a glimpse of the cognitive processes un-
derlying mathematical norms. I would like to close this section with 
a long quote from Jean Piaget, who has also emphasized biological 
and cognitive underpinning in science and mathematics.50 The quote 
is from a short monograph based on the lectures he gave at Colum-
bia University in 1968:
It is agreed that logical and mathematical structures are abstract, 
whereas physical knowledge - the knowledge based on experience 
in general - is concrete. But let us ask what logical and mathematical 
knowledge is abstracted from. There are two possibilities. The first is 
that, when we act upon an object, our knowledge is derived from the 
49 D. Knuth, Surreal Numbers: How Two Ex-Students Turned on to Pure Mathematics 
and Found Total Happiness, Addison Wesley, Reading (Mass.) 1974.
50 J. Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, B. Walsh (trans.), University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1971.
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object itself. This is the point of view of empiricism in general, and 
it is valid in the case of experimental or empirical knowledge for the 
most part. But there is a second possibility: when we are acting upon 
an object, we can also take into account the action itself, or opera-
tion if you will, since the transformation can be carried out mentally. 
In this hypothesis the abstraction is drawn not from the object that is 
acted upon, but from the action itself. It seems to me that this is the 
basis of logical and mathematical abstraction.
In cases involving the physical world the abstraction is abstrac-
tion from the objects themselves. A child, for instance, can heft ob-
jects in his hands and realize that they have different weights - that 
usually big things weigh more than little ones, but that sometimes lit-
tle things weigh more than big ones. All this he finds out experien-
tially, and his knowledge is abstracted from the objects themselves. 
But I should like to give an example, just as primitive as that one, in 
which knowledge is abstracted from actions, from the coordination 
of actions, and not from objects. This example, one we have studied 
quite thoroughly with many children, was first suggested to me by a 
mathematician friend who quoted it as the point of departure of his 
interest in mathematics. When he was a small child, he was counting 
pebbles one day; he lined them up in a row, counted them from left 
to right, and got ten. Then, just for fun, he counted them from right to 
left to see what number he would get, and was astonished that he got 
ten again. He put the pebbles in a circle and counted them, and once 
again there were ten. He went around the circle in the other way and 
got ten again. And no matter how he put the pebbles down, when he 
counted them, the number came to ten. He discovered here what is 
known in mathematics as commutativity, that is, the sum is independ-
ent of the order. But how did he discover this? Is this commutativ-
ity a property of the pebbles? It is true that the pebbles, as it were, let 
him arrange them in various ways; he could not have done the same 
thing with drops of water. So in this sense there was a physical as-
pect to his knowledge. But the order was not in the pebbles; it was he, 
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the subject, who put the pebbles in a line and then in a circle. Moreo-
ver, the sum was not in the pebbles themselves; it was he who united 
them. The knowledge that this future mathematician discovered that 
day was drawn, then, not from the physical properties of the pebbles, 
but from the actions that he carried out on the pebbles. This knowl-
edge is what I call logical mathematical knowledge and not physical 
knowledge.
The first type of abstraction from objects I shall refer to as simple ab-
straction, but the second type I shall call reflective abstraction, using 
this term in a double sense.51
This articulates the position that mathematical objects and theo-
rems reveal as much about our cognitive operations as about the ex-
ternal world. The implication of this view for norms is that even math-
ematical norms are not mind-independent as they are purported to be, 
but are actively constructed by the cognitive agent. 
7. Conclusions
In the course of the previous five sections, we have looked at several 
examples that illustrate cognitive aspects of norms in the domains of 
language, art, law, science and mathematics. When we consider these 
historical examples, some may take a view that, ok, now we know 
that those theories, models and their underlying norms were wrong, 
but we have better theories now. We know vacuum exists but aether 
does not; we know eugenics is a bad social policy; we know there are 
eight planets in our solar system (after Pluto was plutoed out); and 
so on. But such a view misses the whole point. Hobbes and his col-
leagues also were sure that vacuum was impossible. Michelson was 
51 J. Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, E. Duckworth (trans.), W.W. Norton, New York 
1971, pp. 15–17.
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sure that aether had to be there. Justice Holmes was sure that eugen-
ics is justified in the interest of the society for feeble-minded people. 
Sizzi and Bacon were sure that there could not possibly be an eighth 
planet. What we know now, and what we feel sure about now, can 
change, and can change drastically in the future.
This can be illustrated by another comment by Francesco Sizzi. 
Later on, as a part of the same argument against the discovery of Ju-
piter’s moon by Galileo, he argued: “Furthermore, the [alleged] sat-
ellites [of Jupiter] are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can 
have no influence on the earth, and therefore would be useless, and 
therefore do not exist.”52 Analogous arguments are made by many re-
spected philosophers these days in arguing why empirical data from 
brain-imaging studies is irrelevant for understanding emotions, free 
will, consciousness, and so on.
We did not discuss norms in ethics and morality directly here, but 
I would like to note that views presented here resonate with the treat-
ment of moral norms articulated by Jesse Prinz: 
I will argue that morality derives from us. The good is that which we 
regard as good. The obligatory is that which we regard as obligatory. 
The ‘we’ here refers to the person making a moral claim and the cul-
tural group with which that individual affiliates. If the good is that 
which we regard as good, then we can figure out what our obligations 
are by figuring what our moral beliefs commit us to. Figuring out what 
we believe about morality is a descriptive task par excellence, and one 
that can be fruitfully pursued empirically. Thus, normative ethics can 
be approached as a social science.53
To conclude, we claim that norms are ideals that a cognitive 
agent (or a society) strives for. But they are based on its current un-
52 Quoted in Quoted in J. L. Christian, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 570.
53 J. J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(UK) 2007, p. 1.
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derstanding of itself and the world. As the agent (and the society) 
evolves, norms are also revised. Norms stay at a distance, so they go 
beyond the current landscape of social and cultural conventions, but 
they show the horizon effect: they recede and change as we approach 
them, sometimes radically.
